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erences by means of internal operations in 
search of connectivity. Luhmann explains 
that self-reference “includes the capacity to 
determine itself internally through a com-
bination of ‘self-identity’ and ‘self-diversity’ 
and at the same time to leave room for exter-
nal co-determination” (Luhmann 1995: 290). 
Meaningful internal references as well as ex-
ternal ones are constituted inside the system, 
since meaning does not exist in the environ-
ment. The system cannot operate in the envi-
ronment, as pointed out a bit late in §9, and 
the distinction between self-reference and 
hetero-reference (or other-reference) has to 
remain a system-internal difference.
« 10 » Self-reference not being intro-
duced along those lines in §8, it is more dif-
ficult for the reader to realize that Luhmann 
makes use of the very same conceptual ap-
paratus when describing the self-referential 
operation of communication in a social 
system. When the reader is told in §10 that 
communications “involve three selections,” 
there is no mention that information is 
hetero-reference, utterance is self-reference 
and understanding requires distinguishing 
the two internally. The unity of the three se-
lections is co-created inside the system, and 
does not exist anywhere else. To make things 
more difficult, §9 has been inserted in be-
tween, and the reader is hastily introduced 
to the three forms of self-reference: basal 
self-reference (the self is an element), reflex-
ivity (the self is a process) and reflection (the 
self is a system). At the end of §9, the reader 
is then abruptly told that basal self-reference 
is “the condition that characterizes the au-
topoiesis of the system.”
« 11 » Table 1 is an attempt to fill in the 
blanks and to show how concepts taken 
from the section under scrutiny, such as 
basal self-reference (§9), recursive networks 
(§12), connections (§13) and communica-
tion (§10) fit with Luhmann’s statement 
that “basal self-reference is a constitutive re-
quirement” for autopoiesis (Luhmann 1995: 
443).
« 12 » When the authors write in §14 
that “communication emerges as the unit 
of information and utterance,” we are not 
told the whole story. Something is missing. 
What we read in Luhmann is rather that 
information and utterance “are forced into 
unity” (Luhmann 1990: 12) and that com-
munication requires the production of an 
emergent unity” (Luhmann 1993: 774). The 
gap observed here goes deeper than a choice 
of vocabulary between “unit” and “unity.” 
Luhmann does use the two words together 
in the following sentence: “The unity of a 
communication is due to the system that 
reproduces itself by producing units of this 
kind through a network of units of this 
kind” (Luhmann 1996: 261). He clearly 
states in this paper, two paragraphs before 
the sentence quoted here, that his intention 
is to relate the concept of communication to 
a self-referential domain.
« 13 » In the last paragraph (§14) of the 
section under scrutiny, the word “mean-
ing” is repeated six times, with an emphasis 
on “the meaning of communication” and 
“meaning in the consciousness” and “in 
the communication.” Luhmann’s warnings 
about the fact that meaning is constituted 
and that there are no bits of meaning wait-
ing to be picked up by a system in the en-
vironment do not seem to have been really 
heard. When a meaning-constituting sys-
tem makes one selection, it neutralizes and 
sometimes negates the possibilities that are 
not actualized in that selection. But it does 
not eliminate them as possibilities. “The 
world is not reduced to only what is actu-
ally being attended to each time a selection 
is made,” says Luhmann, “It still remains as 
the horizon of references, as the horizon of 
further possibilities, and thus as the domain 
from which followup selections or further 
choices are made.” (Luhmann 1987: 177)
« 14 » If the intended purpose of §§6–14 
was to start with the notion of self-reference 
and to move from there into a closer exami-
nation of the autopoiesis of social systems, 
then the reader has been offered a bumpy 
ride. To study the workings of meaning-
based autopoietic processes may not be an 
easier path, but it is worth undertaking since 
it could very well be the condition of pos-
sibility for interdisciplinarity.
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> upshot • I discuss two aspects of Ca-
denas & Arnold’s target article. The first 
concerns some clarifications of the socio-
logical importance of the concept of au-
topoiesis and the second the criticisms 
of this concept and its applications in the 
social sciences.
« 1 » The concept of autopoiesis is in-
deed a successful case of abstraction, gener-
alization and respecification (in the sense of 
Stichweh 1987: 447, quoted by the authors: 
§50) involving two disciplines very distant 
from each other: biology and sociology. 
This concept is important not so much be-
cause it “explains” something that has re-
mained unclear so far, but rather because it 
obliges the social sciences to rethink their 
tradition and to exclude many of the con-
cepts that are still taken for granted today.
« 2 » First of all, defining social systems 
as systems recursively reproducing their 
own elements through their own elements 
re-opened the old question of what the el-
ements of social systems are. As we know, 
traditionally there have been two answers 
two answers: individuals or actions – social 
actions. In both cases, there have always 
been problems. on the one hand, defining 
social systems on the basis of individuals 
always raises the problem of what is meant 
by this concept of an individual – its body? 
Its consciousness? But to describe or even 
explain how the law, families or formal or-
ganizations work, starting with the idea of 
a set of individuals seems to be challeng-
ing. on the other hand, the concept of ac-
tion has never been defined satisfactorily 
either. Action refers to the actor and to its 
intentions, and also to all that can condition 
them. At the same time, however, nothing 
of what is social can be explained in terms 
of someone’s intention or will. Therefore ad-
ditional concepts became necessary, such as 
the idea of unintended consequences of ac-
tion (Merton 1936) or evolutionary theory. 
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Luhmann’s solution, considering communi-
cation as the basic operation of social sys-
tems (Luhmann 1992), tackles both prob-
lems. Luhmann defines communication 
as understanding the difference between 
information and utterance (§10): commu-
nication then takes place only if and when 
it is understood and this means that its con-
sequences depend on who understands and 
not on the intentions of the participants. 
Above all, this implies that communication 
is an exclusively social operation.
« 3 » If we take the concept of autopoi-
esis to the extreme, I think it shows an inter-
esting feature: a system is either autopoietic 
or not. There is no middle way: a system 
cannot be “a little” autopoietic, just as a 
women cannot be a little pregnant (Matu-
rana’s example, quoted in Luhmann 2002b: 
116). In this sense, autopoiesis as an either/
or-concept is the condition of existence of 
a system, at least for living, conscious and 
social systems: if there is a system, then it 
is autopoietic.
« 4 » The literature, however, does not 
always agree with this point. Legal studies 
(sociology and theory of law) especially 
have discussed “autopoietic law” in depth 
(among the many publications, see Teubner 
1988). For instance, one may have doubts 
that a system can really be or remain au-
topoietic if society imposes local conditions 
(such as family relationships, diffuse cor-
ruption and economic and political pres-
sures) that the system cannot control at all, 
depending on inputs from other systems. 
For example, some scholars speak of allo-
poiesis of law in certain territories (for the 
case of Brazil, see Neves 1992 and 2001). or, 
in a completely different context, Gunther 
Teubner refers to autopoiesis as a “gradual-
ized concept” (Teubner 1988: 222 and 1989: 
38) and distinguishes between autonomy 
and circularity: while circularity exists or 
does not exist (“there is no such thing as 
half circularity,” Teubner 1988: 222), au-
tonomy could be seen as a “gradualized” 
concept, and observing the evolution of a 
differentiated system means also observing 
its becoming more and more autonomous.
« 5 » Luhmann’s objection to the con-
cept of gradual autopoiesis is rather abstract 
and sophisticated (Luhmann 2002b: 116f). 
Still, I think it deserves to be elaborated. 
Luhmann distinguishes between autopoi-
esis and causal relationships. Autopoiesis 
does not indicate certain causes that allow 
the reproduction of a system’s operations. It 
indicates the mere fact that each operation 
is followed by another operation. But how 
this happens cannot be explained by the 
concept of autopoiesis.
« 6 » The possibility to connect opera-
tions with further operations depends on 
the relationship of the system to its environ-
ment, on its ability to build structures and to 
be irritated by the environment it is dealing 
with: “The condition of connectivity [An-
schlussfähigkeit] does not suffice in order 
to produce the next state” (Luhmann 2002b: 
117f, my translation). Autopoiesis is not a 
“creatio ex nihilo.” Therefore, other condi-
tions are needed, which can be described 
by concepts such as structural coupling 
(Luhmann 2002b: 118–141; for applica-
tions of structural coupling to the obser-
vation of law as a social system, although 
with questionable interpretations of this 
concept, see also Febbrajo & Harste 2013). 
This implies that autopoiesis refers only to 
operations, not to structures.1 If we define 
as autopoietic a system able to reproduce 
its own operations through its own opera-
tions, in fact we have not yet said anything 
about its structures. In other words, while 
autopoiesis takes place or not, structures 
may vary considerably depending on the 
evolution of the (living or social) system. 
This can be observed in the diversity of life 
forms, as well as in the various social forms 
of the past (tribes, ancient judicial proce-
dures, divination, medieval guilds, etc.) and 
of the present (functional differentiation as 
a primary societal structure, formal organi-
zations, mass media, etc.).
« 7 » Although I generally agree with 
the arguments of the authors, doubts arise 
when they write: “The social and the bio-
logical concepts of autopoiesis appear then 
as two facets of the same operational phe-
nomenon” (§51) and take this suggestion 
as a point of departure for interdisciplinary 
research (§51f). But it is not clear what this 
means. The concept of autopoiesis presup-
1 | By structures I mean everything that al-
lows the system to operate. Modern society’s 
structures are the law (courts, constitutions, 
norms, etc.), the economy (banks, companies, 
stock markets, etc.), individual careers and so on.
poses a clear distinction between different 
types of systems: an organic system cannot 
connect its operations with social or psy-
chological operations (in fact, even con-
sciousness is an autopoietic system: Luh-
mann 1985a) and vice versa. If the different 
types of autopoiesis are not clearly distin-
guished, a certain confusion can arise, as 
one of the texts cited by the authors in §52 
shows: Eldridge (2002) speaks actually of 
behavior rather than of communication as 
objects of his analysis, although without 
saying whether he considers them to be 
elements of the system, in any case refus-
ing to consider institutions such as a court 
as “an abstract system of communication” 
(Eldridge 2002: 302). But in what sense 
an organized “behaviour,” aiming to make 
judicial decisions, could be something dif-
ferent from communication remains unex-
plained.
« 8 » Finally, I agree with the authors 
regarding the philosophical and ideological 
criticism of the concept of autopoiesis when 
they quote Danilo Zolo and Jürgen Haber-
mas (§§40–46). To this, I want to add that 
the problem is always the observer’s posi-
tion. For example, if one distinguishes be-
tween social systems and “lifeworld” (Leb-
enswelt), as Habermas does, the question 
arises of where one places oneself. on which 
side of his distinction should Habermas 
be placed? He certainly cannot be a social 
system, otherwise his theory collapses. But 
neither can he act as a Lebenswelt because 
for most of his readers he is only a sociolo-
gist or a philosopher, an author of books. 
Should we assume that society is made up 
of social systems, lifeworlds and Habermas? 
The same problem arises in the discussion 
on “the new realism” against constructivism 
(Ferraris 2014): how can an observer distin-
guish between reality and construction or 
interpretation without being God? In the 
highly sophisticated language of George 
Spencer Brown (1969), the problem is if 
and how a distinction re-enters into itself. 
Is the distinction between a lifeworld and a 
social system drawn by the lifeworld or by 
the social system? or does the distinction 
between “real reality” and interpretation 
belong to the reality or to interpretations? 
I think that in neither case can the ques-
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« 9 » There is no doubt that one of the 
most important theoretical problems of all 
scientific disciplines, including sociology, 
is the position of the observers and there-
fore the quality of the distinction they make 
(Kauffman 2014). This is the keystone of 
every theoretical development. But we have 
to admit that, as fascinating these develop-
ments are, sociology take them into account 
only to a limited extent.
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Authors’ Response
on the Criticisms against the 
Autopoiesis of Social Systems
Hugo Cadenas 
& Marcelo Arnold
> upshot • Firstly, we discuss the main 
criticisms of our arguments. Secondly, 
we address the comments and observa-
tions on some parts of our article. We 
conclude with some reflections about 
the perspectives of the discussion on the 
autopoiesis concept.
Introduction
« 1 » With very much pleasure, we have 
read the commentaries on our article and we 
are grateful to all the commentators for their 
perusal of our target article. Thanks to their 
contributions, we can resume this useful de-
bate for the development of systems theory 
and constructivist thought.
« 2 » In this response we address their 
criticisms that we consider relevant for the 
debate and discuss their main points as well 
as additional issues to clarify our position 
and to amend our arguments.
defending the biological theory 
of autopoiesis
« 3 » We would like to start with the 
commentary of humberto Maturana, whom 
we consider one of the greatest contempo-
rary contributors to the development of sys-
tems theory. In his text, Maturana not only 
restates his original arguments about the 
social phenomenon but also introduces new 
ideas and concepts resulting from his recent 
work with Ximena Dávila. Even though Mat-
urana presents mainly a reaffirmation of his 
own position rather than direct discussion 
of our article, we nevertheless believe that it 
is fruitful to respond to the doubts Maturana 
has regarding our understanding of his 
ideas. His main criticism is that our article 
“does not represent what I have said in my 
writings” (§1). on the contrary, we would 
like to emphasize that we do not believe that 
our reading of his ideas is profoundly mis-
leading, and Maturana’s commentary serves 
well to reinforce our claims with regard to 
his concept of the “social.”
« 4 » Maturana’s arguments about the 
social are a good example of this. He writes 
that social relations are exclusively “the in-
ner feelings, emotions and doings […] of mu-
tual care, collaboration, honesty, equity and 
ethics” (§9, emphasis in the original). Mat-
urana considers all other “human relations” 
as non-social.
« 5 » It does not require any training in 
sociology to be aware that Maturana’s con-
cept of the social is too narrow. If one wishes 
to reduce the task of understanding the so-
cial phenomenon by focusing only on such a 
“communitarian” conception of the social – 
as he clearly does in §13 – one would have to 
leave out many of the current and past top-
ics of the social sciences. Based on Maturana’s 
definition, one could argue in favor of cer-
tain “ethical” imperatives for life in a good 
society – similarly to the “discourse ethics” 
of Jürgen Habermas (1987) – but based on 
these principles, it is impossible to establish 
a theory of society with a sufficient level of 
generality.
« 6 » Although Maturana is a biologist 
and professedly explains the social phe-
nomenon from the biological perspective, 
he tries to discuss basic concepts of social 
sciences. It is there where, unfortunately, 
Maturana’s ideas do not represent significant 
progress, precisely because of the lack of 
dialogue with social sciences. His commen-
tary on our criticism is yet another symptom 
of this.
« 7 » In contrast to Maturana’s text focus-
ing on the defense of his concept of the “so-
cial,” hugo urrestarazu aims at a more specific 
defense of the biological concept of autopoi-
esis. He points out that our article misses its 
target since the extension of the concept of 
autopoiesis to social systems is not justified 
(§24, §35) because it disregards important 
aspects of the original theoretical proposal 
of Varela, Maturana and Uribe (1974) (§8, §9, 
§35).
« 8 » Although urrestarazu agrees with 
our proposal of a “common language” for 
systems research (§20), he emphasizes the 
inconvenience of adopting the concept of 
autopoiesis by social systems theory, i.e., he 
espouses a defensive position similar to that 
of Maturana, albeit from a slightly different 
angle.
« 9 » one might well abandon any at-
tempts to discuss the notion of autopoiesis 
of social systems, and leave things as they 
are. After all, the proponents of this concept 
and their followers frown upon the appli-
cation of autopoiesis beyond their self-im-
posed biological boundaries. In this sense, 
urrestarazu would be right, and the use that 
we defend would neither be “justified” (§35) 
nor “theoretically adequate” (§35) since it 
does not follow the definition of Varela, Mat-
urana and Uribe (1974) either. In urrestara-
zu’s perspective, his canonical reading of the 
instructions of the creators of the concept is 
the only legitimate way to read them.
« 10 » observing the state of the art in 
social systems research, one can see an en-
tire field of studies dedicated to the autopoi-
esis of social systems that takes little notice 
of the restrictions imposed by Maturana and 
his followers. This is largely due to the fact 
that scientific research – especially systems 
research – grows in a heterodox way. only 
if an orthodox stance was adopted, would 
any unauthorized use of a concept appear as 
“unjustified” or “theoretically inadequate.”
« 11 » From its beginnings, Niklas Luh-
mann’s theory was such an unorthodox 
exercise in conceptual construction. Its 
original concept of social system is based on 
Talcott Parsons’s ideas but was transformed 
by means of an equivalence functionalism, 
as opposed to structural functionalism. 
